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Abstract
The point of this paper is to measure empirically the distribution of the commodity tax
burden between consumers and producers. For that purpose, two French reforms are studied.
These reforms are steep decreases of the VAT rate on housing repair services on the one hand,
and on new car sales on the other hand, the last sector being far more concentrated. The
consumer share of the commodity tax burden is 77% in the housing repair services market
and 52% in the new car sales market. That confirms the theoretical result of the consumer
share increasing with the competition level. This result may influence recommendations
about differentiated commodity tax rates.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the economic impact of commodity tax reforms, and attempts to measure
the share of the burden of these taxes between consumers and producers. Commodity taxa-
tion is heavily used all around the world, through different kinds of tax. In Europe, a VAT
system is in effect and those taxes take up a large part of fiscal incomes. For an example, the
2006 French budget forecasted VAT would represent 48.8% of total fiscal incomes. Indeed,
commodity taxes are quite easy to collect and are assumed not to generate distortions as
they are paid by consumers.
Classical differentiated taxation recommendations are based on that assumption, and
therefore do not take tax shifting matters into account.
However, the commodity tax burden is not paid by consumers only but is shared between
consumers and producers. Theoretical studies demonstrated that this share depends on mar-
ket properties. The question of the value of the consumer share of the tax burden depending
on the market may have political implications, as it may affect the optimal commodity tax
schedule. For an example, the values of VAT shifting on prices should have an impact on the
European debate on reducing VAT rates for labor intensive services. However, few is known
about the actual values of the indirect tax burden consumer shares.
The point of this paper is to measure this tax burden share, using price data around the
time of two French VAT reforms. The consumer share is found to be 77% in the housing
repair service market, and 52% in the new car market. This confirms the theoretical results
spelling that the consumer share increases with respect with the competition level in the
market.
A number of papers have studied the question of commodity tax shifting on prices theo-
retically. Katz & Rosen (1985) studied a closed Cournot oligopoly. Stern (1987) and Besley
(1989) considered the free-entrance impact, based on the conjectural variation model devel-
oped by Seade (1980). Delipalla & Keen (1992) compared consumer shares of specific or ad
valorem commodity taxes, and found that the consumer burden is higher in the case of spe-
cific commodity taxes. These papers all pointed out the influence of imperfect competition
on tax shifting on prices.
From an empirical point of view, Besley & Rosen (1999) tested tax shifting through a
number of local commodity tax variations in the United States. They found very few mar-
kets with a consumer share of the commodity tax burden significantly different from 100%.
The few goods whose tax shifting on prices are found significantly different from 100% are
sold through the retail industry. Taxes on these goods are over-shifted, which means that
the consumer share is higher than 100%. Delipalla & O’Donell (2001) tested the theoretical
results of Delipalla & Keen (1992) in the case of the European tobacco market and confirmed
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the results. These papers pointed out properties on tax shifting, but none actually measured
sharply the values of the consumer share of the commodity tax burden, which is the purpose
of the present paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the theoretical framework of this study. The parameters that will
be estimated are explained - the value of the consumer share depending on prices and tax
rate variations. The theoretical results that are tested in the following sections are then
presented. An oligopoly model with conjectural variations is used for that purpose. It shows
the influence of the competition level on commodity tax shifting on prices. The consumer
share is increasing with respect to the competition level in the market.
Section 3 presents the data. The empirical work uses price data at the time of two reforms
that induced ample VAT rate variations. July 17th 1987, the French VAT rate on car sales
went down from the luxury-rate of 33.33% to the full-rate of 18.6%. September 1st 1999,
the French VAT rate on housing repair services went down from the full-rate of 20.6% to the
reduced-rate of 5.5%.
Section 4 presents the results of estimates, confirming the theoretical results presented in
section 2. Mainly, the consumer share is 77% in the housing repair service market and 52%
in the new car market, as the first market is far more competitive than the second one.
Section 5 concludes on the share of the commodity tax burden between consumers and
producers, depending of the competition level in the market. A simple model is used to build
a Ramsey formula taking into account tax shifting. The optimal commodity tax rate is found
decreasing with respect to the demand elasticity and to the consumer share.
2 Theoretical framework
The point of the present paper is to measure consumer share. What is called consumer share
is the share of the tax burden paid by the consumers. This consumer share is noted s and
also represents the tax shifting on prices.
The tax analyzed in that study is VAT, which is an ad valorem commodity tax applied on
the before tax price. The before tax price is p1+τ where p is the selling price, and the amount
of the tax is then τp1+τ . After a variation of the VAT rate, the consumer price variation is
dp
dτ
.
The producer price variation - the variation of the before tax price - is
d( p1+τ )
dτ
, that is equal
to
dp
dτ
(1+τ)−p
(1+τ)2 .
Consumer share is then :
s =
(1 + τ)
p
dp
dτ

 1 + τ
1 + τ
(
(1+τ)
p
dp
dτ
)

 (1)
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This expression may seem very complicated, but one should note that s is the image of
x = (1+τ)
p
dp
dτ
by the function f : x 7→ x 1+τ1+τx . This function f is strictly increasing with
respect to x, with only two fixed points 0 and 1. Therefore, if x = (1+τ)
p
dp
dτ
is inferior to
100%, so is the consumer share s. Furthermore, if x1 of good 1 is higher than x2 of good 2,
the consumer share s1 of good 1 is higher than the consumer share s2 of good 2. The rest
of this section studies the influence of market properties on the proxy x = (1+τ)
p
dp
dτ
of the
consumer share.
Under perfect competition, this proxy is equal to :
x =
ǫo
ǫd + ǫo
(2)
Where ǫo =
p
O
∂O
∂p
is the supply elasticity and ǫd = −
p
D
∂D
∂p
is the demand elasticity.
Equation (2) shows that the consumer share under perfect competition is always inferior to
100%. It increases with respect to the supply elasticity and decreases with respect to demand
elasticity.
Under imperfect competition, over-shifting could happen. What is called over-shifting of
the tax is a consumer share superior to 100%, which means that the selling price increase is
higher than the amount of the tax. A full-shifted tax induces an increase of the price equal
to the amount of the tax increase, and then a consumer share of 100%. The classical case is
with consumer shares inferior to 100%, that taxes are under shifted on prices.
In order to understand what happens under imperfect competition, I study an oligopoly
model with conjectural variation, as developed by Seade (1980), then Katz & Rosen (1985).
The version presented here is close to the Stern (1987) version. Non-constant marginal costs
are added, and a direct inclusion of the tax rate is made in order to have more directly
interpretable results.
The model considers n firms producing a unique good at cost K + C(qi) where K is a
fixed cost and C the cost, depending on qi, the production of firm i. With this cost function,
C(0) = 0. This is a model with conjectural variations, what means that when one of the n
firms on the market changes its production qi, it anticipates a variation production of the
other firms equal to ∂Q−i
∂qi
∣∣∣a = αQ−iqi - where Q is the global production and Q−i = Q− qi is
the production of all firms except i. γ = α+ 1−α
n
= 1
n
∂Q
∂qi
is thus a parameter between 1
n
and
1, increasing with respect to the market power of firms. With γ = 1
n
, the model is a Cournot
oligopoly, with price determined as a Nash equilibrium, there is no collusion on this market.
With γ = 1, the price determined in the market is monopoly price, this case represents the
total collusion on the market.
The specification of this model with K = 0 and γ = 0 - wich implies α = − 1
n−1 - results in
equilibrium under perfect competition. Finally, p is the selling price, ǫ = −pQ
′
Q
the demand
elasticity and F = p ǫ
′
ǫ
the elasticity of the demand elasticity .
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The profit of firm i is :
Πi =
p
1 + τ
qi − C(qi)−Ki (3)
Because of the conjectural variations, the anticipated price variation with respect to its
own production variations is for firm i :
∂p
∂qi
∣∣∣∣
a
= p
(
∂p
∂Q
Q
p
)
∂Q
∂qi
1
Q
= −
γ
ǫ
p
n
Q
(4)
Looking at symmetrical equilibrium, equation (5), and (6) follow. Equation (5) is the
firm profit maximization condition and equation (6) is the stability condition :
p
1 + τ
(
1−
γ
ǫ
)
−
∂C(q)
∂q
= 0 (5)
F > −2
ǫ
γ
+ 1 + ǫ− ǫc
(
ǫ
γ
− 1
)
(6)
Where c = ∂C(q)
∂q
is the marginal cost and ǫc =
q
∂C(q)
∂q
∂2C(q)
∂q2
the elasticity of the marginal
cost c with respect to the production q. There is no solution if ǫ is not superior to γ.
Moreover, the stability condition (6) restricts the possible values for F . However, F can take
every positive value, and some negative values. The more the marginal cost increases with
respect to the production the less condition (6) is constraining.
Differentiating equation (5) on an equilibrium path, with n fixed, and p and τ as variables,
results in price shifting proxy xcgo in a Cournot Generalized Oligopoly. The results are given
by equation (7).
xcgo =
1 + τ
p
dp
dτ
=
1− γ
ǫ
1 + (ǫ− γ)ǫc −
γ
ǫ
+ γ
ǫ
F
(7)
As ǫc =
1
ǫo
under perfect competition, equation (7) with γ = 0 gives the perfect competi-
tion consumer share. The point is to understand the influence of collusion on the consumer
share. Equation (8) gives the sign of the differentiate of the price shifting proxy - xcgo - with
respect to the collusion parameter γ.
sgn
(
∂xcgo
∂γ
)
= sgn
(
−
F
ǫ
)
(8)
Condition (8) states that oligopolistic consumer share is inferior to perfect competition
consumer share if F > 0, and superior if F < 0. In the market for non-addicting goods,
consumer share of the tax burden decreases relative to collusion.
The point of the following sections is to emplement empirical measures, in order to test
if it is consistent with reality.
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3 data
In order to test the theoretical results presented in the previous section, two tax reforms are
studied. The point is to study tax rate variations large enough to get sharp measures of the
consumer share. There have been few large tax rate changes, and the only reforms that can
be studied are those changing the commodity tax category of one kind of good1. There have
been two such reforms. September 17th 1987, the VAT rate on new car sales went down from
the luxury-rate of 33.33% to the full-rate of 18.6%. September 1st 1999, the VAT rate on
housing repair services went down from the full-rate of 20.6% to the reduced-rate of 5.5%.
The comparison of tax shifting in these two markets is meaningful as the new car market
is a closed oligopoly and the housing repair market is close to perfect competition. Obviously,
there are very few new car producers, and fixed costs to enter the new car producing market
are very high. Between 1992 and 2002 the mean ratio of fixed capital on value added for the
car industry was 455%, which is indeed very high.
In addition, the 1999 reform applied to housing repair services only and not to housing
building. Fixed costs to enter the market are low. Housing repair service firms are for the
most part very small firms, often with only a few employees. The mean ratio of fixed capital
on value added for personal and domestic services between 1992 and 2002 was 32%, which
indeed is low.
Moreover, table 1 gives the number of firms by size for each of those two economic sectors.
In this table is also included an index calculated on this data with a Herfindahl-Hirschman
formula.
The Concentration index is found equal to 0.02% for the housing repair service industry
and 8.96% for the new car sales industry. This confirms the assumption that the new car
sales industry represents oligopoly and housing repair service industry represents perfect
competition.
In order to study these reforms, I use the time series of price index, IPC, build by INSEE2.
The new car index and the dwelling repair index are used to measures the consumer share
of commodity tax burden.
Furthermore, the general index is used in order to implement a double difference regres-
sion. At that point, I construct a new index that is the index for all goods except the one
1Some smaller reforms occured, they are studied in Carbonnier (2005). The sources of variation are not
enough to estimate sharply the consumer share values. However, they are enough to point out short run
asymmetrical effects in tax shifting.
2INSEE : Institut National de Statistiques et d’Etudes Economique, the French statistic agency. IPC :
Index des Prix a` la consommation, it is build with a classification near the international reference COICOP,
with more details. There is 12 divisions, 86 groups and 161 classes. It is calculated every month. More
than 1 000 different goods representing the 161 classes are included, their prices are observed all along the
month in 27 000 saling points in 106 cities with more than 2 000 inhabitants. IPC is a annually chain-linking
Laspeyres index.
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Housing repair services New car sales
Firm classes Number of Firms Percent. of empl. Number of Firms Percent. of empl.
(by nb. of employees) of that class in firms of that class of that class in firms of thas class
0 124 347 47.82% 74 34.74%
1 to 2 65 649 25.25% 34 15.96%
3 to 5 35107 13.50% 18 8.45%
6 to 9 18 116 6.97% 20 9.39%
10 to 19 11 021 4.24% 14 6.57%
20 to 49 4 804 1.85% 18 8.45%
50 to 99 663 0.25% 8 3.76%
100 to 199 221 0.08% 5 2.35%
200 to 249 34 0.01% 2 0.94%
250 to 499 44 0.02% 7 3.29%
500 to 999 17 0.01% 2 0.94%
1000 to 1999 12 0.00% 2 0.94%
2000 to 4999 10 0.00% 6 2.82%
5000 & more 0 0.00% 3 1.41%
Overall 260 045 100% 213 100%
Concentration 0.02% 8.96 %
Table 1: Concentration in the car and the housing repair sectors
Data presented here come from the French data base SIRENE.
The concentration parameter is calculated as an Herfindahl-Hirschman index, taking the number of employees as
proxy of the size of the firms. As data do not give the exact number of employees in each firm, the number of
employees used for a firm is the lower limit of the segment it belongs to.
studied, using for that purpose the weight coefficient of the studied index in the general
index.
In order to control the regression, production costs are also used. The proxies of produc-
tion costs are the price index of rents on the one hand and of energy on the other hand.
Figure 1 and 2 show the general price index and the new car price index around the time
of the 1987 reform - figure 2 shows this data sharply around the time of the reform as figure
1 shows longer time series. Figure 4 shows the general price index and the housing repair
service price index around the time of the 1999 reform - figure 4 shows this data sharply
around the time of the reform as figure 3 shows longer time series.
Figure 2 shows that the 1987 VAT shifting in new car prices was strictly positive. Even if
the new car price volatility seems quite high, one can clearly see a huge new car price fall at
the time of the reform. At the same time the overall price index seems not to have undergone
shocks.
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Figure 1: Car prices around September 1987 tax reform, long time series
The continuous curve is the INSEE price index - base 100 : 1980 - for new cars.
The discontinuous curve is the INSEE price index - base 100 : 1980 - for everything except new cars.
September 17th 1987, the VAT tax rate on new car sales went down from the luxury-rate of 33.33% to the full-rate
of 18.6%.
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Figure 2: Car prices around September 1987 tax reform, short time series
The continuous curve is the INSEE price index - base 100 : 1980 - for new cars.
The discontinuous curve is the INSEE price index - base 100 : 1980 - for everything except new cars.
September 17th 1987, the VAT tax rate on new car sales went down from the luxury-rate of 33.33% to the full-rate
of 18.6%.
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Figure 3: Housing repair service prices around September 1999 tax reform, long time series
The continuous curve is the INSEE price index - base 100 : 1998 - for housing repair services.
The discontinuous curve is the INSEE price index - base 100 : 1998 - for everything except housing repair services.
September 1st 1999, the VAT tax rate on housing repair services went down from the full-rate of 20.6% to the
reduced-rate of 5.5%.
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Figure 4: Housing repair service prices around September 1999 tax reform, short time series
The continuous curve is the INSEE price index - base 100 : 1998 - for housing repair services.
The discontinuous curve is the INSEE price index - base 100 : 1998 - for everything except housing repair services.
September 1st 1999, the VAT tax rate on housing repair services went down from the full-rate of 20.6% to the
reduced-rate of 5.5%.
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The 1999 VAT shifting was also strictly positive. Figure 4 shows that the 1999 VAT
rate decrease shifted strongly on housing repair service prices. Housing repair price index
underwent very small fluctuations, except at the time of the reform, when it fell. At the
same time the overall price index seems to remain quite linear.
4 Tax shifting Measures
The point of this section is to calculate the values of the consumer share. Preliminary
estimates may be done. With the values presented in figure 2 and not taking in account
the inflation trend, the fall was of 3.7% for new car prices in the four months following the
1987 reform (the new car price index is 1738 for August 1987 and 1674 for December 1987).
Inflation of new car prices was 4.2% in the year preceding the reform, which leads to a new car
price fall adjusted for inflation of 5.3% of the price in four months. The VAT rate decreased
from 33.33% to 18.6%, which represents a fall of 11%. A preliminary estimate of tax shifting
on new car prices is thus 48%.
With the values presented in figure 4 and not taking in account inflation, the fall was
8.4% for housing repair service prices in four months (the housing repair service price index
is 1017 for August 1999 and 932 for December 1999). Inflation for housing repair service
prices was 1.5% in the year preceding the reform, which leads to a housing repair service
price fall adjusted for inflation of 8.8% of the price in four months. The VAT rate decreased
from 18.6% to 5.5%, which represents a fall of 11%. A prelimirary estimate of tax shifting
on housing repair service prices is thus 80%.
In order to get sharper measures of the tax burden share, regressions are implemented.
The parameter that has to be measured is the parameter s defined by equation (1) in section
2. Therefore, using the operator ∆t defined by equation (9), double difference regressions are
implemented following equation (10) :
∆t(X) =
Xt −Xt−1
Xt−1
(9)
∆t(pdependant) =
4∑
i=1
αi∆t+1−i(1 + τ) + β∆t(poverall) +
∑
i
γi∆t(pcontroli) + ǫt (10)
Where poverall is the general price index, and the controls are the rent index and the
energy price index. According to equation (1), this regression gives the consumer share as
presented by equation (11) :
Consumer share = f
(
4∑
i=1
αi
)
=
(
4∑
i=1
αi
)(
1 + τ
1 + τ
∑4
i=1 αi
)
(11)
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These regressions are implemented for both the new car market around 1987 and the
housing repair market around 1999. The regressions take into account the three years around
the reforms. Results are compiled in table 2.
(1) (2)
Housing repair services New car sales
Number of observations 36 36
R2 99% 67%
VAT rate shifting during the 1st month (α1) 0.169*** 0.173***
(0.009) (0.043)
VAT rate shifting during the 2nd month (α2) 0.472*** 0.272***
(0.009) (0.045)
VAT rate shifting during the 3rd month (α3) 0.072*** 0.025
(0.009) (0.044)
VAT rate shifting during the 4th month (α4) 0.024*** 0.032
(0.009) (0.044)
Consumer share+ 77%*** 52%***
(2%) (6%)
Table 2: Consumer share measures
This table presents the results of the regressions of housing repair service prices in the one hand and of new
car sale prices in the other hand, on VAT rate changes.
*** : 1% significant
+ : Calculated as the sum of the coefficients until the last significant, according to equation (11)
As it appears from figure 2 and figure 4, results are very sharp and the tax rate variations
explain the main part of the price variations. The R2 of these regressions are therefore very
high : 99% for the housing repair services and 67% for new car sales.
In addition, these results are very significant (1% significant). The standard errors are
very small and so the measures of the consumer shares are very sharp. The values themselves
- and not only their signs - are meaningful.
A first result is the very rapid rate of tax shifting. For both goods, taxes shifted almost
entirely during the first two months following the reforms. The ratio between tax shifting
during the first two months and tax shifting during the two following months is 7.8 for the
1987 reform on new car sales and 6.7 for the 1999 reform on housing repair services.
Because of the small standard errors, the difference between the two measures is also
significant. The difference between consumer shares in the housing repair service market and
in the new car sales market is 25%, with a standard error lower than 7%. The difference
between the two tax shiftings is then 1% significantly positive.
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This results are shown in figure 5. This figure shows the price reaction of both the new
car sales and the housing repair services as estimated by the regressions. The error bars
indicate the 95% confidence intervals as estimated by the regressions.
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Figure 5: Price reaction simulation
The curves are the prices - base 100 before the reforms - as they appear out of the regressions.
Error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
The discontinuous curve - “consumer share=100%” - shows the prices that would occured if the consumer
share was 100%.
Figure 5 show clearly that the 95% confidence intervals of the prices new car sales and
housing repair services do not cross. Hence, this figure illustrates that tax shifting on housing
repair service prices is higher than tax shifting on new car sales.
5 Conclusions
Analyzing huge VAT variations, this study provides sharp measures of the consumer shares
in two very different markets. As Delipalla & O’Donell (2001), only under-shifting of taxes
are found. Moreover, the consumer share in the housing repair service market - a close to
perfect competitive market - is very significantly higher than the consumer share in the car
market - a quite closed oligopoly with very few firms competing.
These empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that tax shifting is increasing
with respect to competition level in the market. This result is quite intuitive: because the
price is close to the marginal cost in perfect competition, firms can not pay a large part of
commodity taxes. On the opposite, oligopoly firms already capture a part of the consumer
11
surplus without commodity taxes, they thus have to support a large part of the commodity
tax burden.
This dependence of tax shifting with respect to competition level may have political
implications as to fiscal decisions. For example, it should influence the decision to choose
which kind of goods has to be taxed to the full-rate or to the reduced-rate. Firms acting in low
competition markets pay a bigger part of commodity taxes than firms acting on competitive
markets. Therefore, commodity taxes can be a mean for States to capture a part of oligopoly
rents.
Including these results in a simple model produces a version of the famous Ramsey for-
mula. Let us consider a single consumer - which reflects the case with preference homogeneity
- and two goods 1 and 2. The consumer utility is u(q1, q2) depending on the quantities qi of
good i consumed. This utility function is assumed to be separable, and linear with respect
to money. The prices of these goods are pi = 1 + siti, where the prices with no taxes are
normalized at 1, ti is the tax on good i and si the consumer share of this tax. The consumer
maximization results in :
∂u
∂q1
p1
=
∂u
∂q2
p2
= 1 (12)
The State wants to earn a minimum income R with commodity taxes. Its objective is to
maximize the consumer utility. The State maximization first order conditions are :
∂u
∂qi
∂qi
∂pi
∂pi
∂ti
+ λqi + λti
∂qi
∂pi
∂pi
∂ti
= 0 (13)
Where λ is the Lagrange parameter of this maximization associated to the State budget
constraint. As the elasticity of good i demand is ǫi = −
pi
qi
∂qi
∂pi
, the tax rate - for ad valorem
taxes - is τi =
ti
pi
, and ∂pi
∂ti
= si, the first order conditions (13) result in the optimal tax rate :
τi = −
1
λ
+
1
siǫi
(14)
The optimal tax rate is not such that taxes more the goods for which demand is less
elastic, but to tax the goods for which the effect of the consumer share through demand
elasticity is weak. For two goods with the same demand elasticity, it is optimal to tax more
the less competitive one.
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